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I.

Chapter I. Social, Political, and Medical Background

In 1996, California passed Proposition 215 (the Compassionate Use Act), making marijuana
available for medical purposes. Licensed physicians could recommend marijuana for treatment
of serious illnesses. Patients were allowed to cultivate, possess, and use marijuana. Gonzales v.
Raich determined the fate of California’s right to allow medical marijuana in spite of federal
prohibition. In 2002, California deputy sheriffs and DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration)
officials entered Diane Monson’s home. Monson used medical marijuana pursuant to Prop 215
and owned six Cannabis plants. DEA officials destroyed the plants pursuant to federal marijuana
laws. Monson has a number of illnesses that cause severe back pain and muscle spasms. Her
doctor recommended marijuana after a number of medications failed.1 Angel Raich has suffered
from a number of debilitating illnesses, which confined her to a wheelchair. Two anonymous
caregivers provided her marijuana free of charge. A few of her illnesses included life threatening
weight loss, an inoperable brain tumor, and temporary paralysis.2 She also used medical
marijuana pursuant to Proposition 215. Monson and Raich brought legal action, claiming
protection under Prop 215, and that the Controlled Substance Act exceeded congressional
authority under the Constitution’s commerce clause, and violated the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments.3
This chapter will discuss the social, political, and scientific history of marijuana that lead
up to Prop 215. The story goes back to the late nineteenth century when marijuana was not a
widely known drug, and most legislators and middle-class households had never heard of the
drug. However, by 1937 the federal government criminalized it. To understand why lawmakers
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prohibited marijuana, it is important to understand the drug climate at the turn of the century. In
the post Civil War era, overmedication, easy availability of drugs, and a lack of knowledge about
the drugs’ addictive qualities resulted in high addiction rates for numerous drugs.4 Doctors
perpetuated the addictive culture by using the strongest drugs to treat mild conditions; for
example, opium was used to treat fever and diarrhea.5 By 1884, an estimated 182,215 people
were addicted to narcotics, and 782,118, by 1913.6 This climate instilled a concern surrounding
drugs within the general population, and called legislators to action. The 1914 Harrison Act, first
of several pieces of legislation, indicated growing public concern.

Marijuana’s Social and Political History

Though the Harrison Act did not regulate marijuana, it was the first of several federal acts
initiating restrictions on drugs that would eventually include marijuana. The Harrison Act was a
reaction to the public concern over high addiction rates to cocaine and opiates. It regulated these
narcotics by, first, requiring people who imported, produced, transferred, or in any way handled
narcotics to register with the federal government. Second, it heavily taxed these registered
persons.7 Congress thus used its power of taxation to indirectly regulate narcotics. The scope of
Congress’s constitutional powers had not yet evolved to provide a basis for an outright ban.8
The Harrison Act left hundreds of thousand drug addicts without a safe, legal supply of drugs.
These addicts turned to the streets to purchase their drugs. The sharp and dramatic increase in
demand inflated costs, forcing addicts into criminal activity to pay for their drugs. Crime
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increased as the demand for expensive illegal narcotics increased. As crime increased, public
concern increased, and ultimately, the public began to equate drug usage with criminal activity.9
The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (UNDA) of 1934 made its appearance. By the early
1930s, the majority of the public had not heard of marijuana, but those who had heard of it were
uninformed about the drug. Its use was largely confined to Mexican-American communities, but
had also infiltrated to Black ghetto areas. The drug hardly appeared in the media; between 1914
and 1927, New York media outlets published four marijuana-related articles.10 When it did
appear in the media, however, newspapers portrayed the drug as dangerous and even murderinducing. In 1914, the New York Times reported that marijuana was as dangerous as morphine
and cocaine, and could be used to substitute such drugs.11 A 1929 article in the Denver Post
reported a Mexican-American man who murdered his stepdaughter was a marijuana addict.12
Articles such as this one drew a link between marijuana and crime in the public’s mind. To
those who had heard of it, marijuana was just as dangerous and crime-inducing as other
narcotics.
The act was not federal legislation, but was drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners, and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics encouraged all states to enact it. The
committee aimed to identify and outlaw all habit-forming substances. The first two drafts of the
bill prohibited marijuana, but the final draft did not.13 By 1937, thirty-five states adopted the
act.14
After the UNDA, Congress enacted the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, requiring that those
who imported, handled, or sold marijuana to register with the federal government and pay an
occupational tax.15 Congress aimed at effectively prohibiting the drug through a strict
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registration process and heavy taxes. The act also bolstered drug enforcement policy. Congress
structured the bill almost identically to the Harrison Act. Public concern over drugs had waned
after the passage of the UNDA, and marijuana remained a relatively unheard of drug. The most
plausible cause for its passage was an overzealous Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). The FBN
commissioner, Harry Ainslinger, campaigned state to state against marijuana.16 He used articles
published by William Randolph Hearst, which denounced marijuana as evil. Hearst led the
media opposition to marijuana by portraying it as a drug of violence. Some speculate Hearst’s
motives were financially based. He possessed heavy financial investments in the lumber and
paper industries and saw the production of hemp as a competitive resource thus seeking its
prohibition.17 The Tax Act effectively prohibited marijuana without any empirical evidence to
support Congress’s claims that the drug causes criminal activity and that school children were
using it.18 Ultimately, the act did not immediately affect usage since so few people knew about
the drug to begin with.
Between 1948-1950, narcotic arrests increased by 77 percent, provoking the Boggs Act
of 1951. Marijuana arrests increased as well in this time period; however, it is unclear whether
this was a result of increased usage or better drug enforcement.19 Nonetheless, Congress called
for harsher penalties for drug violations. The act established uniform penalties for different
drugs; possession of marijuana called for the same penalty as possession of heroin. First offense
mandated two to five years in a federal penitentiary, second offense: five to ten years, third
offense: ten to twenty years, and each offense included a 2,000 dollar fine.20 The Boggs Act
gave the public the perception that marijuana was a hard and dangerous drug, and as a result,
narcotics use decreased significantly.21 The act also opened up the marijuana debate among
lawmakers and scientists. During the congressional hearings, legislators brought doctors, crime
6

prevention specialists, and FBN officials to testify that marijuana acts as a stepping-stone to
other drugs, primarily heroin.22 However, other scientific research differed, in a paper filed
during the hearing, Dr. Harris Isabell, Director of Research at the Public Health Services
Hospital claimed marijuana was not physically or psychologically addicting. Dr. Isabell said,
“Marihuana smokers generally are mildly intoxicated, giggle, laugh, bother no one, and have a
good time. They do not stagger or fall, and ordinarily will not attempt to harm anyone.”23
Despite the sharp decrease in usage after the Boggs Act, Congress passed the Narcotics Control
Act in 1956, increasing mandatory minimum sentencing and raising the fine per offense to
20,000 dollars.24
By the 1960s knowledge of marijuana became ubiquitous; the drug infiltrated middleclass families and college campuses. By 1965, many teenagers and young adults had used the
substance, and in 1970, some college campuses reported as high as 70 percent usage among
students.25 People discovered marijuana was not as dangerous as the Boggs Act suggested. It
became the drug of the counter-culture, a part of people’s lifestyle, and associated with liberal,
anti-war political views.26 Smoking marijuana became a form of political dissent, and many
supported the reduction of harsh marijuana penalties.27 The public discovered that the marijuana
trade was not run by criminals, but by casual users: mostly students and young professionals.
Criminal organizations found the drug too cheap to invest in. After the outbreak of marijuana
usage, the FBN found it difficult to enforce marijuana laws.28
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,
which abolished mandatory minimum sentencing established by the Boggs Act; possession of
drugs became a misdemeanor.29 Title II, the Controlled Substance Act, separated drugs into
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different categories based on medical utility and potential for abuse. Congress classified
marijuana as a Schedule I drug, meaning it had no medical utility.30
In 1978, Robert Randall discovered a medical use of marijuana: it reduces intra-ocular
pressure in the eyes caused by glaucoma. Authorities arrested him for marijuana cultivation and
use, but through a series of legal battles he won the right to treat his glaucoma with marijuana.
Existing glaucoma medications were not always successful, thus cannabis became a viable
alternative medication.31 As a result of the Randall’s legal battles, the federal government
instituted the Compassionate Investigational New Drug Program (IND), which allowed
thousands of applicants to use marijuana to relieve pain associated with major illnesses.32
While public support for marijuana grew between the 70’s to the late 90’s, it remained
unpopular with the federal government. By the early 1980’s, thirteen states nonetheless
approved laws permitting medical use of marijuana.33 However, the Reagan and Bush
administrations opposed marijuana use, and in 1991, President Bush discontinued the
Compassionate IND Program. The president claimed it sent the “wrong signal”, since his
administration officially opposed marijuana use.34 By the time President Clinton took office, a
Michigan study concluded that over 25 percent of twelfth-graders had smoked marijuana. The
nation viewed Clinton as being soft on marijuana policy. Two factors contributed to this notion:
Clinton had used marijuana before and he disproved of Bush’s drug policy of imprisoning
addicts instead of rehabilitating them.35 The increasing public popularity set the stage for
Proposition 215.
California voters passed Prop 215 (Compassionate Use Act) in 1996 by a 56 to 44
percent margin. This ballot initiative allowed patients, with a doctor’s recommendation, to
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possess, grow, and use marijuana for pain caused by severe illnesses. Dennis Perron, owner of
the San Francisco Cannabis Buyer’s Club, and Californians for Medical Rights spearheaded the
initiative. Most support came from black and white communities. In response to Prop 215,
President Clinton confirmed that federal marijuana law would continue to be enforced, and
patients receiving medical marijuana would be treated as those using for recreational purposes.
The Department of Justice threatened to penalize doctors recommending marijuana to patients.
Penalties included revocation of prescription writing abilities and exclusion from Medicaid and
Medicare programs.36
In 2002, Raich and Monson filed suit against United States Attorney General John
Ashcroft and head of the DEA, Asa Hutchinsona, claiming that applying the Controlled
Substance Act to intrastate possession and trade of marijuana was unconstitutional. The
interstate commerce clause did not extend far enough to regulate the intrastate marijuana trade.
Monson and Raich lost in the District Court, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, upholding the constitutionality of Prop 215.37 In 2004, the Supreme Court
would decide whether the federal government could regulate the intra-state medical marijuana
trade in Gonzales v. Raich.

Medical Marijuana Research

This part of the chapter will provide a brief history of scientific research on marijuana,
and the Institute of Medicine’s report on marijuana. Overall, in the development of marijuana
policy, most lawmakers simply ignored contemporary marijuana research. During Gonzales v.
9

Raich, however the Supreme Court, the petitioner, and respondent relied heavily on these
findings. It is important to understand the development of the scientific and medical knowledge
of marijuana to compare and contrast what the scientific evidence said about marijuana with
what the government and the public thought about the drug. Lawmakers and the public feared
marijuana until the 1960s, but that fear did not stem from sound marijuana research. Most
marijuana research, prior to the Boggs Act of 1951, reported mild effects, but differed with
modern medical marijuana research. Modern research found different medical benefits than
early research.
In 1912, Victor Robinson’s book, An Essay on Hasheesh, was one of the first scientific
reports on marijuana. It was published when marijuana was a relatively unknown substance and
two years prior to the Harrison Act. Robinson reported that the habitual use of marijuana caused
a bloated face, weak limbs, and deterioration of mind. Immediate marijuana effects included
increased heart rate, quickened or slowed breathing, increased appetite, increased urine quantity,
and increased uterus contractions. He claimed medical benefits included the treatment of
depression, hysteria, vomiting, cough, and a cure for morphine addiction.38 Some of Robinson’s
findings align with modern medical marijuana research; however, his data suggested a crude
understanding of marijuana’s effects. Robinson’s study was one of the earliest to suggest a
medical use of marijuana. In fact, marijuana had already been used for medical purposes as early
as 1860, when the Ohio State Medical Society reported medical marijuana as treatment for pain,
inflammation, and cough. Medical marijuana was also used in the early 1900s. The Squibb
Company invented Cholordyne, a mixture of marijuana and morphine, to treat stomach pain.39
However, by the 1930s, scientific research, debate among lawmakers, and newspaper articles
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suggested that marijuana was no longer used for medical purposes. To confirm this, in 1942, the
U.S Pharmcopoeia removed marijuana from its list of medications.40
Scientific marijuana research from the 1930s to 1950s focused on the drug’s danger to
society. The public perception of marijuana ranged from a murder-inducing drug, a steppingstone to other illicit drugs, a cause of criminal activity, to a substitute for other illicit drugs.
Some contemporary marijuana research substantiated these fears, while others claimed the
opposite. The Panama Canal Zone Governor’s Committee studied marijuana’s effects and
possible links to crime. It found marijuana was not habit-forming and did not negatively affect
the user. In comparison to alcohol, marijuana caused much less criminal activity.41 In 1934, Dr.
Walter Bromberg, a senior psychiatrist, examined 2,216 felony inmates. He concluded that
marijuana did not promote crime, explaining the users who caused criminal activity were already
mentally pre-disposed to causing crimes. However, not all reports supported marijuana. Eugene
Stanley, the New Orleans District Attorney, wrote an article, “Marihuana as a Developer of
Criminals”. The article suggested marijuana gave criminals a “false courage” to commit crimes,
thus linking usage with criminal activity. However, Stanley did not use empirical evidence to
support his claims.42 The Journal of American Medical Association claimed marijuana caused
hallucinations, physical deterioration, and dementia.43 Overall, marijuana research conducted
around the 1930s was inconclusive. In the 1950’s, the Boggs Act instigated new marijuana
research. As previously discussed, Dr. Harris Isabell’s research concluded that marijuana was an
innocuous substance that did not develop dependence or cause criminal activity.
The Nixon administration’s war on drugs dominated the federal government’s drug
policies during the 1960s. Nixon fervently opposed marijuana on moral grounds. He organized
a committee to scientifically prove the drug’s evil and uselessness. Nonetheless, his commission
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called marijuana a “rather unexciting compound”, that when used intermittently caused no
physical or psychological damage. The commission even went as far as to imply that marijuana
should be legal until the government could prove why it should be criminalized. Outraged by the
results, Nixon denounced his own commission, and continued to claim marijuana decayed
society and morality.44 During the 1960s, the federal government’s perception of marijuana still
lagged contemporary scientific research.
In 1997, the Executive Branch again turned to science when the White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy requested the Institute of Medicine, a part of the National Institutes
of Health (NIH), to report on marijuana’s medical efficacy. The Institute’s findings were
integral to the arguments made by both parties and the Supreme Court. The report concluded
that marijuana has potential medicinal value, however, because of the harmful effects of
smoking, it suggested a rapid-onset, non-smoked delivery system. The report admitted
marijuana does not perform as well as other medications, but a subpopulation of patients react
poorly to certain medications and respond well to marijuana. The Institute found no evidence
suggesting marijuana was a gateway drug.45 However, despite positive research, the Clinton
administration condemned medical marijuana, and opposed Proposition 215.
The Institute of Medicine analyzed marijuana’s potential for medical use in several
categories: pain, chemotherapy, malnutrition, spasticity, movement disorders, epilepsy, and
glaucoma. Primarily, it found benefit in alleviating pain, preventing nausea and vomiting
associated with chemotherapy, and preventing wasting syndrome associated with AIDS. The
report found marijuana unable to treat muscle spasms and movement disorders, and found it not
as effective as modern medications in treating glaucoma. Randall and others, first, used
marijuana to treat glaucoma in the 1970s, however, by the 90’s new medications treated intra12

ocular pressure much more effectively. According to the Institute, marijuana is only effective
against glaucoma in high doses, and even then, the effects are short-lived.46
The Institute of Medicine established certain parameters for medical marijuana and how
it could be useful in the treatment of chemotherapy, wasting syndrome associated with AIDS,
and pain. Chemotherapy causes nausea and vomiting. Marijuana may be used as a substitute for
anti-emetic medications, if the patient responds poorly to alternative medications. Orally
ingested anti-emetic medication may be ineffective if the patient vomits it out, and the
medication leaves the system. Smoked marijuana could serve as an alternative since it cannot be
vomited out, and its effects occur immediately. However, due to the harmful effects of smoking,
the Institute suggested a rapid-onset delivery device, for example, a cannabinoid inhaler.
Wasting syndrome symptoms include nausea, appetite loss, pain, and anxiety. There are
medications that, individually, perform better than marijuana in treating these symptoms.
However, some patients react poorly to these medications, and no single medication treats these
symptoms as well as marijuana does collectively. In regards to pain, the analgesic effects of
marijuana would successfully treat pain associated with spinal cord injuries, peripheral
neuropathic pain, central post-stroke pain, chronic pain, and insomnia.47 According to the
Institute of Medicine, these are the ways marijuana may be used medically. In conclusion, the
Institute suggested the development of a rapid onset delivery device for THC because smoking
marijuana produces harmful effects. These harmful effects include abnormalities in cells lining
the respiratory tract, possible risk of cancer, and possible withdrawal and dependence. However,
patients using smoked marijuana for relief should not suffer because a safe THC delivery device
has not been invented.48
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In response to the Institute of Medicine, Barry McCaffrey, the director of the White
House National Drug Control Policy condemned smoked marijuana. He said,
“No clinical evidence demonstrates that smoked marijuana is good
medicine. The National Institute of Health (NIH) has examined all existing
clinical evidence from both animal and human research in order to determine the
efficacy of smoked marijuana. It has concluded that there is no clinical evidence
to suggest that smoked marijuana is superior to currently available therapies for
glaucoma, weight loss and wasting associated with AIDS, nausea and vomiting
associated with cancer chemotherapy, muscle spasticity associated with multiple
sclerosis or intractable pain.”49

Furthermore, in his response, he claimed marijuana was a gateway drug, and that children who
used it were 85% more likely to use cocaine than children who had not used the drug.50 He
concluded that marijuana should remain a schedule I drug, that Prop 215 violated federal law,
and was unnecessary because Marinol, a schedule II drug, contains the active compound in
marijuana, and is effective in treating wasting syndrome. McCaffrey butchered the Institute of
Medicine’s research. First, the Institute of Medicine said smoked marijuana provided relief from
certain illnesses thus possessed medical value. Second, marijuana may not be superior to
existing medications; however, some patients reacted poorly to these medications. Marijuana
treated a wide range of symptoms better than any single medication did. Third, the Institute
found no causal connection between marijuana use and other hard drugs. McCaffrey’s report
disagreed with all of the Institute of Medicine’s marijuana findings. According to McCaffrey,
Marinol is superior to marijuana in treating vomiting and nausea since it comes in pill form thus
does not harm the heart, lungs, and immune system like smoking does.51 He ignored the
possibility the pill may be vomited, and ignored that Marinol cost up to 17 dollars a pill.52 The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) held marijuana to a different standard than other drugs.
14

Marijuana had to outperform all existing medications in-order to prove its medical value.
Marijuana was the exception; no other drug has to do that. For example, Prozac (fluoexetine)
must only prove that it relieves depression; the FDA did not compare its efficacy to other antidepressants.53

Conclusion

Public concern over drug abuse combined with a lack of marijuana knowledge caused
lawmakers to prohibit the drug in 1937. Increased drug abuse between 1948 and 1950, caused
legislators to increase marijuana possession penalties. During this time, public marijuana use
and knowledge was low. Lawmakers lumped marijuana with harder drugs, such as heroin and
cocaine, into anti-drug legislation. During the 60s, marijuana use increased significantly,
penetrating the middle class and college campuses. In 1970, Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, defining marijuana as a substance with
no medicinal value. In 1978, Robert Randall discovered marijuana effectively combats
symptoms of glaucoma. The federal government opened the Compassionate Investigational New
Drug Program, allowing thousands of applicants to treat their illnesses with marijuana. The new
program created a contradiction in the federal government’s stance on marijuana. This
contradiction would continue through the passage of Prop 215. Clinton condemned California’s
Prop 215. Despite condemning state marijuana programs, the Clinton administration re-opened
the Compassionate IND Program after Bush closed it, and Vice President Gore’s sister
participated in Tennessee’s medical marijuana program for her chemotherapy.54
15

Gonzales v. Raich was a product of a collision between state and federal marijuana
policies. It would decide over the constitutionality of the Controlled Substance Act and
Proposition 215, and how much Congress could regulate under the interstate commerce clause.
The federal government seemed to irrationally oppose medical marijuana use, scientific research,
and nearly all their arguments against marijuana contained holes. Nixon ignored his own
marijuana research committee’s own findings. In 1988, the DEA did not take the advice of its
own chief administrative law judge, who said marijuana “is one of the safest therapeutically
active substances known to man.”55 Clinton opposed Prop 215 yet reopened the federal
government’s compassionate use program. McCaffrey gave a skewed account on the Institute of
Medicine’s suggestion for medical marijuana. California voters disagreed with the federal
government’s conclusions over the medical value of marijuana when they passed Prop 215.
Angel Raich and Diane Monson sued the federal government for protection from prosecuting
state authorized medical marijuana users. The Supreme Court had to decide the fate of
California’s medical marijuana program in Gonzales v. Raich.
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II.

Chapter II. Legal Background

Gonzales v. Raich posed the question of whether under the interstate commerce clause,
Congress can regulate the noncommercial, intrastate medical marijuana possession and
cultivation. The government contended the federal Controlled Substance Act (CSA) applied to
the use of medical marijuana, thus making California’s Prop 215 invalid under the Supreme
Court. The legal background of Raich involves four Supreme Court cases: Wickard v. Filburn
(1942), Perez v. United States (1971), United States v. Lopez (1995), and United States v.
Morrison (2000). These pivotal cases ruled on the extent to which Congress could regulate
commerce. The federal government could only regulate intrastate activity under certain
circumstances. First, the activity must have been of an economic nature. Second, Congress must
have produced certain findings that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce. Third, the
court must determine that the regulated activity “substantially” affected interstate commerce,
which is Congress’s constitutional domain. Fourth, the federal statute must limit its reach to a
specific set of cases.56 The four listed Supreme Court cases delineated congressional authority
over intrastate commerce. The District Court ruled against Raich, but in 2003, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the decision.57 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that by these
four circumstances that the CSA did not apply to California’s medical marijuana trade.
The decisions in Wickard, Perez, Lopez, and Morrison defined the reach of the interstate
commerce clause. The Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes…”58 In Wickard v.
Filburn, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1938 authorized the Secretary of Agriculture
20

to set wheat production quotas for personal use. Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio Dairy Farmer,
exceeded the production limit. Filburn contended that his wheat production was purely
intrastate, and did not enter the stream of commerce, thus making the AAA application to his
wheat production unconstitutional.59 However, the Supreme Court ruled against Filburn. The
court reasoned if a thousand farmers acted as Filburn, then, the wheat production would affect
both supply and demand of the interstate market. This would make Filburn’s activity subject to
federal regulation under the commerce clause. This is known as the aggregation theory.60
Wickard established the precedent that Congress could regulate an intrastate activity if it had a
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court ruled that Filburn, according to
the aggregation theory, could “substantially” affect interstate commerce, thus upholding the
AAA’s constitutionality.61 In light of Wickard, the Supreme Court ruled that marijuana use and
cultivation “substantially” affected interstate commerce.
In Perez v. United States (1971), the Supreme Court affirmed precedent that Congress
could regulate intrastate activity that “substantially” affected interstate commerce. The case
challenged the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which outlawed credit loan sharking. The Court
reasoned that extortionate credit transactions “substantially” affect interstate commerce because
loan sharking promoted criminal organizations.62 Criminal organizations belonged to a “class of
activities” that “substantially” affected interstate commerce, thus, the federal government could
regulate this intrastate activity.63 Perez affirmed Wickard’s precedent that Congress could
regulate intrastate activities, and in doing so, developed the principle of “class of activities”. It
broadened the scope of Congress’s power to regulate intrastate commercial activities.
In United States v. Lopez (1995), the Supreme Court limited the scope of Congress’s
power under the interstate commerce clause. The Court affirmed that Congress could regulate
21

intrastate activities that “substantially” affect interstate commerce, but added that the regulated
activity must be economic in nature.64 In 1992, Alfonso Lorenzo brought a handgun to Edison
High School, and in doing so, violated the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), which
prohibited possession of firearms within a school zone.65 The Court decided that firearms in
school zones did not “substantially” affect interstate commerce, even if Wickard’s aggregation
theory was applied, and the GFSZA did not regulate an economic activity. The Supreme Court
determined the GFSZA did not affect interstate commerce, and was not an economic activity.
Therefore, the Court declared it unconstitutional.66 Congress could only regulate the “channels”
and “instrumentalities” of commerce, and activities that “substantially” affected interstate
commerce.67 These activities that “substantially” affected commerce could be intrastate
activities, although had to be economic in nature.
United States v. Morrison (2000) was the last Supreme Court case before Raich that
shaped the scope of the interstate commerce clause. The case ruled on the constitutionality of
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which allowed victims of gender-motivated crimes to
seek civil suits against attackers. The Supreme Court struck down the Violence Against
Women’s Act because there was no empirical evidence that gender-related crime affected
commerce, and gender-related crime is not an economic activity. Congress produced evidence
linking gender-related crime to commerce, however, the Supreme Court rejected these findings.
This proved important since it showed that it was not enough for Congress to produce findings
linking regulated activities to commerce. They also had to survive judicial scrutiny.68 Morrison
affirmed the commerce clause precedents of previously discussed court cases, and gave the Ninth
Circuit Court a set of standards for deciding Raich v. Ashcroft.
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Morrison established several standards. First, the statute must regulate an economic
activity. Second, there must be congressional findings linking the regulated activity to interstate
commerce. Third, the regulated activity must “substantially” affect commerce. Finally, the
statute must limit its reach to a certain number of cases. The constitutionality of the Controlled
Substance Act hinged on the interstate commerce clause, which states Congress has the power to,
“regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
Tribes…”69 The Controlled Substance Act makes it illegal to, “manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess with the intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance.”70 The government contended that the CSA invalidated California’s Prop 215, which
allowed for the medical use of marijuana upon doctor recommendation. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reviewed the standards of the commerce clause, and the validity of applying the CSA
to medical marijuana use.
Perez ruled that Congress could regulate “class activities” which “substantially” affected
interstate commerce. Previous federal court cases ruled that drug trafficking belonged to a “class
of activities” that affected interstate commerce, thus subjected to congressional regulation. The
Ninth Circuit Court ruled that the, “intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession” of
medical marijuana, is a different “class of activities” than drug trafficking.71 Medical marijuana
proved different from drug trafficking because, first, it pursued and adhered to the principles of
health and safety according to licensed physicians. Second, the market for medical marijuana in
California was much smaller than the market for illicit substances. Third, the medical marijuana
market was non-commercial and purely intrastate.72 The Ninth Circuit Court relied on United
States v. McCoy (9th Circ. 2003) in its evaluation of medical marijuana’s “class of activities”.
McCoy invalidated a federal statute illegalizing the intrastate possession of child pornography
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without the intention to distribute across state lines. The federal government could not regulate
the intrastate possession of child pornography.73 Much like McCoy, the Ninth Circuit Court
ruled that the federal government could not regulate the intrastate possession and use of medical
marijuana on the premise of regulating interstate commerce. Ultimately, medical marijuana
belonged to a different “class of activities” than drug trafficking, and was not subject to federal
regulation under the commerce clause.
Next the Ninth Circuit Court decided whether or not the CSA regulated an economic
activity, pursuant to Lopez. It decided medical marijuana use was not an economic activity.74
Patients did not purchase the medical marijuana; it was provided to them. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines commerce as the “exchange of goods and services.”75 Therefore, the Court
decided that Prop 215 was not an economic activity, thus not subject to regulation under the
commerce clause.
The Ninth Circuit Court determined whether or not the legislative findings supported the
link between the use of medical marijuana and interstate commerce. Morrison established that
congressional findings are subject to judicial scrutiny.76 Congressional findings supported a
causal relation between drug trafficking and interstate commerce. However, when Congress
made these findings, the medical marijuana “class of activities” did not exist. Therefore,
congressional findings could not be applied to medical marijuana. Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit determined the medical marijuana trade did not belong to the drug trafficking “class of
activities”.77 In conclusion, congressional findings supporting the link between drug possession
and use and interstate commerce did not apply to medical marijuana. In regards to the last
standard of evaluating the commerce clause, the Ninth Circuit determined that the CSA did not
limit its reach to a discreet number of cases.78
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After reviewing these commerce clause standards, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
a 2-1 decision, ruled in favor of Raich, claiming the CSA did not apply to California’s intrastate
medical marijuana activity in light of the limited scope of the commerce clause. They decided
distribution of medical marijuana could not be categorized as an economic activity. It belonged
to a “class of activities” separate from drug trafficking. The congressional findings linking drug
use to interstate commerce did not apply to medical marijuana use. For these reasons,
Congress’s interstate commerce power did not support the application of the Controlled
Substance Act to California’s medical marijuana use. On April 20, 2004, the Attorney General
and DEA Administrator requested certiorari from the Supreme Court, and on June 28, 2004, the
Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari. The government brought their case to the Supreme
Court, where the fate of California’s medical marijuana use would be decided.
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III.

Chapter III. Review of the Supreme Court Briefs

In the Supreme Court briefs, the government argued that the Controlled Substance Act
applied to California’s medical marijuana laws in four major points, which addressed all but one
of Morrison’s four standards of commerce clause application. They do not discuss the
“jurisdictional hook” element of the CSA. First, The government claimed that activities
permitted by Proposition 215 substantially affected interstate commerce. Second, the CSA
established a comprehensive drug control system. Third, Congress could regulate the “intrastate
manufacture, free distribution, and possession of marijuana”. Fourth, they disputed the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision that medical marijuana belongs to its own separate class of
activities. This is the framework the government argued against Proposition 215; however, the
government introduced new evidence and arguments that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion did not use.
Points one and three are very similar in nature. Point one used legal precedent to argue why
Prop 215 violated constitutional federal law. Point three focused on the establishment of a
comprehensive drug control policy. The government argued that California’s medical marijuana
falls within this drug policy, and regulation of medical marijuana was essential in regulating the
this drug policy, thus making the regulation of medical marijuana constitutional under the
commerce clause. Raich and Monson argued within Morrison’s commerce clause framework,
but added the argument that by allowing the application of the CSA to California’s medical
marijuana policy, the court would effectively undermine federalism. Raich and Monson agreed
with the Ninth Circuit Court’s analysis of Morrison’s four commerce clause standards; however,
they introduced new arguments and evidence for each standard.
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I.

Is California’s medical marijuana policy an intrastate activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce?

Wickard v. Filburn (1942) established that Congress could regulate intrastate activity if
that activity substantially affected interstate commerce. The government argued Congress could
regulate the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana under the commerce clause and
the necessary and proper clause because it substantially affected interstate commerce. The
government relied on similarities in Wickard to prove medical marijuana bore a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.79 In Wickard, Filburn’s wheat production was not commercial in nature
meaning it did not involve the exchange of goods or services. The wheat was for personal use
and not regarded as commerce. However, the Supreme Court ruled that even though Filburn’s
wheat did not enter the stream of commerce, it was subject to regulation under the interstate
commerce clause.80 The government drew on similarities between Filburn’s wheat in Wickard
and Raich’s marijuana. Raich’s marijuana was for personal use and did not enter the stream of
commerce. So, if the Supreme Court ruled that the noncommercial, personal use of wheat
affected interstate commerce, the same could be applied to medical marijuana. The government
made certain to differentiate the object of regulation in Wickard with that in Lopez, since the
Supreme Court ruled against the commerce clause’s power in Lopez. In Wickard, Congress
regulated an interstate activity, whereas in Lopez, it regulated a non-economic activity.81 The
government argued that by virtue of similarity with the Wickard case, medical marijuana
substantially affects interstate commerce, thus subject to regulation by Congress.
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Raich and Monson countered this argument by explaining three differences between
Wickard and Raich that voided The government’s argument that intrastate medical marijuana use
affected interstate commerce. First, they argued the Agricultural Adjustment Act only applied to
farmers producing wheat above a certain quantity quota. So, Congress determined that wheat
quantity below a certain quota was not subject to the AAA because they did not affect interstate
commerce. The CSA did not exempt small quantities of substances. It assumed that all
quantities of controlled substances affect interstate commerce.82 Second, Wickard involved an
economic activity, whereas medical marijuana did not. The federal government allotted
Filburn’s farm 6.6 tons of wheat for production and sales; Filburn exceeded this quota by double.
Raich and Monson did not partake in commercial activity. They only produced enough
marijuana to support their personal medical needs, and have not participated in a commercial
market.83 Third, the Wickard court required Congress to provide evidence that Filburn’s
overproduction of wheat substantially affected the market. Congress provided the statistic: in the
aggregate, nearly 30% of the nation’s production of wheat is consumed on the farm on which it
was grown.84 This figure proved that in aggregate, Filburn and farmer who practiced the same
home-consumption of wheat adversely affected the supply of the interstate wheat market.
Raich and Monson asked the Supreme Court to hypothetically overlook the fact that
California’s medical marijuana was not an economic activity. Even if it was part of a class of
activities subject to interstate commerce, no evidence existed saying it substantially affected
interstate commerce.85 In California, the GAO determined the percentage of the population of
medical marijuana users in four California districts. All four districts had less than one half of a
percent registered medical marijuana users. Raich and Monson argued that if the rest of
California’s districts had similar statistics that medical marijuana could not have a substantial
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effect on interstate commerce. California’s medical marijuana use was ineffectual compared to
the estimated 10.5 billion dollar nationwide marijuana market in 2000.86 Raich and Monson
defended against the government’s Wickard argument, and provided medical marijuana use
statistics to show that Proposition 215, even in the aggregate, did not substantially affect the
national marijuana market.

II.

Does the CSA establish a comprehensive drug control system that regulates
medical marijuana?
The government argued that the Congress under the commerce power could regulate

commercial marijuana activity. According to the government, all marijuana activity is
commercial in nature and passes through foreign and interstate trade channels.87 The CSA
intended to create a comprehensive and “closed” system for drug production, transportation, and
distribution. The system banned all controlled substances, Schedules II-V, unless Congress gave
specific authorization for the distribution of said substances. The CSA banned schedule I
substances outright. All other distributors of controlled substances violated the federal law.88
The government argued that the CSA had the constitutional right to establish a comprehensive
drug control system because marijuana often passed over state and national lines. To prove that
the marijuana market often flowed through interstate and foreign commerce, the government
relied on statistics from the Illicit Drug Prices in the December 2003 issue of Narcotics Digest
Weekly. The article listed the prices for a type of Canadian marijuana in all fifty states. In short,
all marijuana cultivation and possession was a part of a larger commercial marijuana market.
This interconnected marijuana market penetrated the channels of interstate and foreign
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commerce. By virtue of the commerce clause, the CSA created a comprehensive and “closed”
controlled substance system to regulate all aspects of the marijuana market, including simple
possession and use.
Raich and Monson asserted that the comprehensive system argument violates the basic
principles of federalism. If the argument were applied to everything, states would lose their
ability to exercise basic police powers.89 Raich and Monson cited NLRB v. Laughlin Steel Corp.
(1937) saying a balance must be found between the federal and state powers.90 They also cited
Lopez and Morrison as two examples of when Congress used the commerce clause to regulate
policy traditionally left under state control. Furthermore, Whalen v. Roe (1977) declared states
have the power to regulate medicine and drug administration. Linder v. United States (1925)
ruled that the federal government could not directly regulate medical practices.91 These cases
established boundaries between federal and state power. Raich and Monson used these past
Supreme Court decisions to say that Congress could not regulate drug and medicine policies.
To further condemn the comprehensive system argument, Raich and Monson claimed a
history of federal deference to state law. The court in Parker v. Brown (1943) decided the
Sherman Act applied as long as it did not interfere with contemporary state laws. In the
legislative history, if Congress did not delineate its intentions of overriding state law, the court
must assume the Sherman Act did not invalidate contemporary state contract laws.92 In light of
Parker, Raich and Monson claimed that Congress should have to notify its intent of overriding
state action, pursuant to Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991).93 The decision in Parker can be applied in
Raich. The CSA’s legislative history did not show any intention of abating state drug control;
therefore, California should be able to continue their compassionate use program.94
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III.

Can Congress regulate an intrastate, noncommercial activity?

The government used the comprehensive system argument, hypothetical situations, and
congressional findings to link California’s medical marijuana program to interstate commerce.
The argument hinged on the idea that medical marijuana fell within the broader class of activities
of “controlled substances.” Previous Supreme Court cases found that Congress may regulate the
class of activities known as “controlled substances” because they substantially affect interstate
commerce: a principle pursuant to Perez. The government argued that medical marijuana was a
“controlled substance,” and therefore subject to federal regulation under Congress’s
comprehensive and “closed” system. However, they did not support this claim until part IV.
Under the assumption that medical marijuana is a “controlled substance, they used congressional
findings to provide evidence linking that class of activities to interstate commerce. Then, the
government listed possible hypothetical situations where California’s medical marijuana may
affect interstate commerce. Finally, they claimed medical marijuana undermines the CSA and its
comprehensive system and poses a threat to public health.
The “wholly intrastate manufacture, free distribution, and possession of marijuana”
belonged to a class of activities that affect the interstate marijuana market. The regulation of
intrastate medical marijuana is necessary and proper in regulating the interstate marijuana
market.95 The government relied on Lopez and congressional findings to prove the link between
intrastate drug activity and interstate commerce. First, Lopez permitted Congress to ban
intrastate activity if it substantially affected interstate commerce. Second, congressional findings
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concluded that locally distributed drugs were often transported over state lines, or drugs
cultivated locally were often transported over state lines thus making drugs subject of interstate
regulation.96 Also, local possession of controlled substances increased the local supply of those
drugs, which increased the local demand. An increase in the local supply and demand of drugs
caused an increase in the supply and demand of the drug trafficking market. The government
claimed that if the federal government could not regulate intrastate drug activity, the supply and
demand for interstate markets would increase dramatically.97
The government laid out hypothetical situations or possible problems with intrastate
medical marijuana possession and how it could affect interstate markets. First, medical
marijuana cultivators could produce more marijuana than is medically needed. With this surplus,
cultivators could sell it, inflating black market supply, and affecting interstate commerce.98
Second, the government argued that medical marijuana use replaces use of other legitimate
drugs, which has an adverse effect on the markets for lawful medications.99 Third, law
enforcement could not distinguish between marijuana that was cultivated and used solely within
the cultivator’s home state, and marijuana that has breached interstate lines. The latter argument
claimed that all drug activity is indistinguishable, and falls into the class of activities of
“controlled substances”.100 This last problem posed a threat to the comprehensive drug control
system the CSA purportedly creates. The “closed” system allowed for a means to produce,
transport, and distribute controlled substances under “strict control” for medical purposes. It
combated drug abuse and diversion, which is selling, prescribed substances into the black
market.101 Medical marijuana use undermined this “closed” system because it allows the
cultivation and use of a Schedule I drug, not subject to federal regulation.102 California’s
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medical marijuana affected interstate commerce in the previously enumerated ways, and thus he
government argued the federal government should regulate it.
Raich and Monson used Morrison’s four standards to argue why the intrastate,
noncommercial use of medical marijuana does not affect interstate commerce. They attacked
The government’s comprehensive system argument, use of congressional findings, and
hypothetical situations. According to Raich and Monson, the comprehensive system argument
violated federalism, and proved too expansive by nature. The congressional findings did not
apply to the subclass of activities of medical marijuana. Raich and Monson dismissed the The
government’s hypothetical arguments because no evidence existed suggesting they would
happen.
According to Raich and Monson, the CSA was unconstitutional in its application to Prop
215 under Morrison’s four commerce clause standards. First, California’s medical marijuana
was not an economic activity because there is no exchange of goods or services, and the
marijuana cultivation was not part of a business. Raich and Monson used the following analogy:
if a homeowner plants flowers in their backyard, he or she is different than a person who runs
their own nursery and sells flowers. For The government, the homeowner who planted his or her
own flowers would be engaging in economic activity.103 Second, the CSA did not have a
“jurisdictional element” that limits its application to a specific set of cases.104 Third,
congressional findings cannot be applied to intrastate medical marijuana use. These findings
prove too broad by focusing on all “controlled substances”. Congress claimed most controlled
substances pass through the channels of interstate or foreign commerce; however, these findings
do not inform on whether marijuana under Proposition 215 enters interstate or foreign
commerce.105 Raich and Monson said, “It is undisputed that the cannabis used by Raich and
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Monson for medical purposes does not move, is never transported, and has never flowed through
interstate commerce.”106 Fourth, the government incorrectly categorized California’s medical
marijuana into the class of activities of all “controlled substances” which flowed through
interstate commerce. The government argued that Morrison’s four standards did not uphold the
CSA’s application to Proposition 215.
According to Raich and Monson, the CSA’s purported comprehensive system proved too
expansive and encompassing, infringed on states’ rights, and effectively destroyed federalism.107
The government’s arguments in favor of a link between medical marijuana and interstate
commerce stressed three points: patients could violate state law by diverting their medication
into commerce, the state cannot adequately enforce marijuana laws because they cannot decipher
intrastate marijuana from interstate marijuana, and every marijuana violation substantially affects
interstate commerce.108 In truth, Raich and Monson argued the small number of medical
marijuana users in California cannot substantially affect the marijuana black market. They also
argued medical users did not use the black market because the quantity and quality of the drug is
unknown.109 Furthermore, there was no evidence to suggest medical marijuana cultivators would
divert their surplus marijuana to the black market, and California already has laws prohibiting
diversion.110 Raich and Monson produced more evidence against the link between the federal
comprehensive drug system and simple possession of marijuana. The San Francisco DEA
specifically targeted marijuana trafficking that exceeded 1000 pounds or 500 plants. In 1999,
only 1.2% of 38,288 of federal marijuana arrests were for simple possession of marijuana.111
According to Raich and Monson, these were the reasons why California’s medical marijuana
policy did not substantially affect interstate commerce.
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IV.

Did medical use of marijuana distinguish it from other marijuana which was
subject to federal regulation?

The government agued the Ninth Circuit was wrong in saying that the medical use of
marijuana put the drug into a different class of activities than drug trafficking. The fact that
marijuana was used for medical purposes was irrelevant to the case. Prop 215 did not create a
separate class of activities. Medical marijuana belonged to the larger class of activities known as
drug trafficking. The government argued this was because Raich and Monson’s marijuana use
was economic by nature. According to Proyect v. United States (2nd Circ. 1996), federal courts
must determine if something falls under the commerce clause by its class of activity.112 Medical
marijuana was not different than the illicit marijuana market for two reasons. First, the
government relied on the similarities between Raich and Wickard, which have already been
discussed. Second, they pointed out that when the DEA destroyed Monson’s plants, she had to
resort to buying marijuana on the illegal market. Raich and Monson were cultivating a product
that would otherwise be obtained through an interstate market.113 Finally, the government used
the comprehensive system argument to invalidate the importance of the medical nature of
marijuana. The CSA’s “closed” system accounted for the medical nature of controlled
substances. Marijuana is a schedule I drug, meaning it has no medical purpose, and California
undermined the system by producing and distributing it to patients.114 The CSA requires
physicians to register under it, so a recommendation from a licensed physician cannot exclude
medical marijuana from the CSA’s reach.115
Part four of The government’s argument revisited most of the points made in the first
three parts of their argument. Raich and Monson’s four standard argument already addressed the
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economic nature and class of activity of medical marijuana. However, Raich and Monson
addressed the medical necessity of marijuana in the last part of the their argument. According to
the Doctrine of Necessity, people are permitted to break certain laws if it is necessary, meaning
no reasonable alternative exists. Raich’s physician predicted she would die without smoked
marijuana and no alternative medication would substitute effectively.116 Furthermore, Raich and
Monson argued withholding Raich from marijuana use violated her Fifth Amendment rights.
The due process clause guarantees a basic right to life, and Raich may very well die without
marijuana. Under this argument, the Fifth Amendment protects the right to marijuana use.

Conclusion

In their brief, the government created a four part argument. First, they claimed
California’s medial marijuana did not substantially affect interstate commerce because of the
similarities between Raich and Wickard. In Wickard, Congress regulated a home-grown
commodity, wheat, for personal use under the jurisdiction of the commerce clause. In Raich,
Raich and Monson cultivated and used marijuana within their homes, and their drug never
entered the stream of commerce. If Congress could regulate the wheat in Wickard, it could
regulate the marijuana in Raich. Second, The government argued the CSA created a
comprehensive system for regulating controlled substances including marijuana. This idea relied
on the claim that controlled substances often flow through interstate and foreign channels of
commerce. Therefore, Congress under the commerce power could create a comprehensive
system to regulate these controlled substances. Third, California’s medical marijuana fell under
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the class of activities of “controlled substances” which affected interstate commerce. The federal
courts did not judge the link between a single activity and interstate commerce; rather, the link
between the class of activities that incorporates single activity and interstate commerce.
Congressional findings supported the link between controlled substances and interstate and
foreign commerce based on the assumption that drugs during production, transportation, and
distribution would pass through interstate or foreign borders. Thus controlled substances as a
class of activities were subject to federal regulation. Fourth, California’s medical marijuana fell
under the class of “controlled substances” because it is an economic activity, and the medical
nature of the drug is irrelevant to its class of activity. Raich and Monson cultivated a product for
which a developed interstate market already existed. The CSA regulated this market, and denied
the medical validity of marijuana since it is categorized as a schedule I drug.
Raich and Monson argued California’s medical marijuana did not substantially affect
interstate commerce according to Morrison’s four standard analysis, and violated the basic
principles of federalism. First, Raich and Monson’s activity was not an economic because Raich
and Monson did not pay for their marijuana. Second, congressional findings support link
between controlled substances and interstate commerce, but do not support the link between the
intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana and interstate commerce. Third, medical marijuana
did not belong to the class of activities of drug trafficking, but constituted a separate class of
activities that did not affect interstate commerce. Fourth, the CSA did not limit its reach to a
discrete number of cases. Finally, Raich and Monson claimed there was a tradition of federal
deference to state law. Federal legislation should not override state policy, unless Congress
intended to. The Supreme Court reviewed the facts of the case, and published its Opinion of the
Court on June 6, 2005.
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IV.

Chapter IV. Review of the Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions

On June 6, 2005, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeal’s decision, and upheld the constitutionality of the Controlled Substance Act regulation
of California’s medical marijuana policy. Justice John Paul Steven delivered the Opinion of the
Court. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and
Justice Clarence Thomas each dissented. Justice Stevens applied the rational basis test to the
constitutionality of the CSA, which stated in effect that if Congress had rational grounds for
concluding that medical marijuana use affected interstate commerce, then the activity could be
regulated under the interstate commerce clause. Justice Scalia believed the substantial effects
test was “misleading”.117 He relied on a textualist interpretation of the interstate commerce
clause and the necessary and proper clause to determine that the CSA applied to Raich and
Monson’s activities. He believed that an activity did not have to “substantially” affect interstate
commerce or be of economic nature for Congress to regulate it. Congress need only find
necessary and proper to regulate an activity in-order to regulate interstate commerce
effectively.118 His opinion gave a more liberal interpretation of congressional commerce power
than Stevens’s opinion. Justice Thomas used the same logic as Justice Scalia, by evaluating the
commerce clause and necessary and proper clause to determine medical marijuana’s legality.
However, Justice Thomas believed the scope of the commerce power was too narrow to regulate
medical marijuana. He pursued the founder’s original understanding of the commerce clause’s
reach by relying on McCulloch v. Maryland and the original definition of commerce. Justice
O’Connor believed the majority opinion allowed the federal government to infringe on
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California’s police powers and disrupted the balance of power between the federal and state
governments. She relied on the Morrison’s four factor test to conclude that the CSA did not
constitutionally apply to intrastate medical marijuana use.

Justice Stevens’s Opinion of the Court

Justice Stevens decided the CSA constitutionally applied to California’s medical
marijuana because Congress could rationally conclude medical marijuana could substantially
affect the interstate illicit marijuana market. The rational basis relied on three factors: the CSA’s
findings, the expansive marijuana market, and Wickard. Justice Stevens claimed Congress had
the power under the commerce clause to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affected
interstate commerce. The substantial effects test relied on three points: the economic nature of
the activity, congressional findings, and the class of the activity.
Justice Stevens pointed out the similarities between Raich and Wickard to argue that
Congress could regulate the noncommercial aspect of a market as long as it was within a class of
activities that would affect the market. He said both Filburn and Raich, “cultivate[d], for home
consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate
market.”119 In Wickard, Congress had a rational basis to believe that home consumption of
wheat, in aggregate, could affect the interstate market. In Raich, Congress had a rational basis to
believe the demand in the interstate drug market may divert medical marijuana into the black
market.120 Then, he attacked Raich and Monsons’s three purported differences between Wickard
and Raich. In Raich and Monson’s brief, Raich had argued the AAA exempted farming
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operations smaller than Filburn’s because Congress recognized small farms did not substantially
affect interstate commerce. Second, she had claimed the AAA regulated an economic activity,
whereas medical marijuana was not. Third, the Wickard court had required evidence that wheat
affected the interstate market, and there was no evidence saying medical marijuana affected
interstate commerce. Justice Stevens’s attacked these differences first by maintaining that the
AAA regulation’s exemption of small farming operations was irrelevant because Congress could
still regulate the class of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. Second, the
non-economic claim was irrelevant since in Wickard, Congress regulated the noncommercial
aspect of Filburn’s farm. Third, congressional findings provided evidence that drugs
substantially affected interstate commerce.121 In light of these arguments, Justice Stevens
claimed Respondents were wrong in stating that the congressional findings were inapplicable.
Lopez said Congress did not have to provide “particularized” findings to support their
legislation.122 Therefore, findings supporting the link between controlled substances in general
and interstate commerce were sufficient, and Congress did not have to prove medical marijuana,
itself, substantially affected interstate commerce. However, Justice Stevens held that the
government, in any case, need not prove a substantial effect between medical marijuana and
interstate commerce, but only show a rational basis that the former could affect the latter.
Concerns of law enforcement of drug-related activities and diversion into illegal channels of
commerce provided this rational basis. In addition, Justice Stevens said the necessary and proper
clause allowed Congress to regulate medical marijuana use since without regulation it would
leave a “gaping hole” in the comprehensive system the CSA created.123
In regard to the economic nature of medical marijuana, Justice Stevens differentiated
Raich from Lopez and Morrison by claiming the activities from both those cases (possession of
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firearms inside a school zone and violence against women) completely fell outside the realm of
interstate commerce and were non-economic activities. Justice Stevens deemed medical
marijuana “quintessentially economic”124, and defined economics as the “production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities.”125 According to Justice Stevens, marijuana was
such a commodity, thus an economic activity, which made congressional regulation of the
substance constitutional under the commerce clause.
In regard to medical marijuana’s class of activities, Justice Stevens ruled marijuana did
belong to a subclass of substances different than other illegal substances. However, the rational
basis test still applied to this class of substances because the medical nature of its usage was not a
“distinguishing factor” in its regulation.126 This was because the CSA created a comprehensive
regulatory system, which banned marijuana altogether. The fact that marijuana was used for
medical purposes did not distinguish it from other controlled substances under the CSA, since
the CSA regulated numerous other medically used substances.127 Justice Stevens concluded that
Respondent’s claim that California’s medical marijuana has “hermetically sealed” itself from the
larger illicit market was “dubious”; therefore Congress could rationally reject this idea.128 So,
according to Justice Stevens, medical marijuana did belong to a subclass of activities of
controlled substances; however, Congress could rationally believe this class of activities could
affect interstate commerce.
The majority opinion decided that Congress could rationally conclude that medical
marijuana could substantially affect interstate commerce. Justice Stevens said that Wickard
established the precedent of regulating noncommercial, intrastate activities. Raich differed from
Lopez and Morrison because medical marijuana did not fall out of the realm of commerce
completely, and medical marijuana was innately economic. The medical nature of the drug did
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not distinguish its use from other drug use because the CSA regulated other medically used
controlled substances and banned marijuana use completely. The majority opinion used these
reasons to uphold the constitutionality of the CSA’s application to California’s medical
marijuana policy.

Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion

In his opinion, Justice Scalia sought the “original understanding” of the constitution’s
commerce clause and necessary and proper clause, and how they applied to the intrastate use of
medical marijuana. Justice Scalia wrote the notion that Congress can regulate intrastate activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce was wrong. Instead, he argued Congress could
regulate purely local activities even if they did not substantially affect interstate commerce.
However, the regulation of these purely local activities must be necessary and proper in-order to
effectively regulate interstate commerce. Congress could do this two ways: first, Congress could
“devise rules for the governance of commerce between the States”, or second, Congress could
prohibit anything obstructing or stimulating interstate commerce.129 Under this interpretation,
Scalia believed Congress could regulate much more than it could under the substantial effects
test. The Cato Institute described Scalia’s interpretation as a “leap” forward without a clear limit
to the commerce power.130
Justice Scalia interpretted Lopez and Morrison as holding that non-economic activities
could not be regulated. He used Shreveport Rate Cases (1914) to argue the necessary and proper
standard for applying the commerce clause. Then, he said the CSA established a comprehensive
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regulatory system that included marijuana, and pursuant to this, Congress may ban all interstate
and intrastate marijuana activities. Justice Scalia distinguished Raich from Lopez and Morrison.
The statutes involved in Lopez and Morrison fell completely outside the range of the commerce
power, and the arguments that link the statutes and interstate commerce were laced with
inferences. Lopez and Morrison did not dismiss non-economic activities from the reach of the
commerce power. Justice Scalia said Lopez allowed for the regulation of non-economic
activities that somehow “undercut” interstate commerce if not regulated.131 Also, Lopez and
Morrison differed because they did not decide over a comprehensive scheme such as the CSA,
rather they ruled on single statutes.132
In support of the necessary and proper clause’s application to the interstate commerce
power, Justice Scalia wrote that under United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co. (1942), Congress
could regulate commerce in such a way that “it possesses every power needed to make that
regulation effective.”133 Justice Scalia argued this was the standard for the reach of the interstate
commerce power. He relied on the Shreveport Rate Cases, which allowed Congress under the
necessary and proper clause to regulate “intrastate transactions” in pursuit of regulation interstate
commerce.134 Under his standard of review, Justice Scalia argued Congress could regulate
medical marijuana under the comprehensive regulatory drug system the CSA created.135 In other
words, the regulation of the intrastate, noncommercial use of medical marijuana was necessary
and proper for the regulation of the interstate marijuana market. Justice Scalia argued marijuana
was a commodity and could not be differentiated between interstate and intrastate, and that the
federal government should not have to rely on the state government to enforce drug policies for
the sake of federalism.
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The expansive nature of the opinion was surprising for the traditionally conservative,
textualist Supreme Court Justice. In short, Justice Scalia disapproved of the substantial effects
test. Rather, he maintained that Congress could regulate any activity that it deemed necessary
and proper in regulating interstate commerce. It did not matter what class of activities the statute
belonged to or if it was an economic activity. His opinion hinged on the idea that medical
marijuana activities would undermine the CSA’s comprehensive regulatory system, thus
regulating medical marijuana was necessary and proper for Congress to effectively regulate the
comprehensive system. In disapproval of the opinion, The Cato Institute framed Justice Scalia’s
opinion as regulating a small class of “sick” medical marijuana users were necessary and proper
to defend against the illicit drug market. The Institute also showed its surprise for the expansive
reading of the commerce power.136

Justice O’Connor’s Dissenting Opinion

Justice O’Connor dissented from the majority decision. She argued states had the right to
experiment with social policy, and the CSA’s application to California’s medical marijuana
policy violated the basic principles of federalism. She applied Morrison’s four commerce clause
standards to argue medical marijuana did not involved interstate commerce. According to
O’Connor, states police powers historically “defined criminal activity” and protected the “health,
safety, and welfare of citizens.”137 With the enactment of the CSA, the federal government
aimed at creating an “all-encompassing” comprehensive regulatory system that outlawed the
“possession, distribution, and possession of controlled substances.”138 The government’s
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comprehensive system argument hinged on the notion that medical marijuana fell within the
“controlled substances” class of activity. This system did not differentiate between interstate and
intrastate controlled substances; it simply maintained all controlled substances were subject to
federal regulation. In her argument that medical marijuana constituted a separate class of
activity, Justice O’Connor stated that by allowing Congress to group the intrastate,
noncommercial medical marijuana use with the larger class of activities of the illicit drug market,
it removed “meaningful limits on the commerce clause.”139 She criticized the majority’s holding
that Lopez and Morrison were different because they were single statute instances that fell
outside interstate commerce. However, the CSA established a comprehensive, multi-faceted
drug law, and that could not isolate certain classes of drug usage. In line with this reasoning,
intrastate, noncommercial medical marijuana use fell within the scope of interstate commerce.
Justice O’Connor argued this was wrong because it allowed Congress to virtually regulate
anything as long as it thought the activity in question was essential in regulating a larger
comprehensive system.140 She argued Congress, under the guise of regulating a comprehensive
system, could regulate nearly anything, thus upsetting the balance between federal and state
powers.
In regards to medical marijuana’s economic nature, she criticized the majority’s
definition of “economics” on the account that it was too broad, and could encompass any
“productive human activity”.141 This dictionary definition of “economics” disguised the real
issue: whether medical marijuana was a local or national activity. Raich and Monson possessed
and used marijuana; however, they did not interact with commerce making the drug use a
noncommercial activity. The justice rejected the notion that noncommercial possession could
affect the market by substituting for the commercial use of marijuana. All commercial activity
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has noncommercial substitutes, for example charades could be a substitute for movie tickets.
She concluded that regulating noncommercial activities because they could affect the demand for
commercial goods was unconstitutional and violated the basic principles of federalism.142
Justice O’Connor attacked the majority’s use of Wickard, claiming it was taken out of
context and applied unjustly. She said the majority relied on Wickard to prove Congress could
regulate “any home consumption of a commodity for which a national market exists.”143
According to Justice O’Connor, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) did not regulate farms
producing under a certain quota because Congress, at the time, recognized that those small farms
could in no way affect interstate commerce. The AAA regulated farms that produced over six
acres of wheat, not a few plants. Therefore, Wickard did not automatically allow Congress to
regulate anything on a small scale for which an interstate market existed. There was no evidence
to support that small amounts of medical marijuana affected interstate commerce or the CSA’s
comprehensive system.144 This argument against Wickard fits in with Morrison’s substantial
effects test.

In this vein, Justice O’Connor argued against the majority’s reasoning as to why

Congress could regulate the intrastate, noncommercial use of medical marijuana.
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor criticized the link between medical marijuana and
interstate commerce by attacking the majority’s reliance on Wickard and Congress’s findings
linking drug use to interstate commerce. The Wickard court required evidence that farm’s homeconsumption of wheat affected interstate commerce. The court knew that home-consumption of
wheat, in aggregate, affected the market by 20% of wheat supply.145 This statistic proved a
substantial effect on the interstate market. Furthermore, Justice O’Connor said congressional
findings linking drug use to interstate commerce was not empirical evidence but “legislative
insistence” on the absolute nature of the CSA.146 Justice O’Connor said there was no empirical
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evidence supporting the link between medical marijuana use and interstate commerce; therefore,
medical marijuana failed the substantial effects test.

Justice Thomas Dissenting Opinion

Justice Thomas adopted a textualist approach in his decision by determining if it was
necessary and proper for Congress to regulate the intrastate medical marijuana in-order to
effectively regulate the interstate drug market. He sought the original understanding of the word
‘commerce’ and the necessary and proper clause to determine the extent Congress’s commerce
power. In the latter half of his argument, Justice Thomas attacked the majority’s reasoning in
linking medical marijuana to interstate commerce. ‘Commerce’ as defined by Madison’s notes
on the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers, and ratification debates was “trade or
exchange (and shipping for these purposes)”.147 Then, Justice Thomas determined the original
understanding of the necessary and proper clause as defined by McCulloch v. Maryland (1819).
Chief Justice Marshall maintained for something to be constitutional under the necessary and
proper clause it must maintain “letter and spirit of the constitution”, be “appropriate”, and
“plainly adapted”.148 “Plainly adapted” meant “obvious, simple, and direct relation”.149 Justice
Thomas believed by this standard, the CSA did not regulate medical marijuana use because it
belonged to a subclass of drug activity that was state-regulated. It was not “obvious” why it was
necessary for Congress to regulate medical marijuana use when it did not enter the stream of
commerce, users must have a serious illness, users must obtain a physician’s approval, and users
must give medical information and register for medical marijuana card. On these grounds,
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medical marijuana use was a distinguishable class of activities that did not undermine the CSA’s
comprehensive regulatory system. Therefore, it was not necessary for Congress to regulate
medical marijuana use.150 Justice Thomas found that regulating medical marijuana use was not
‘proper’ on the basis that it upset federalism. Allowing Congress to regulate medical marijuana
infringed on states’ general police powers, thus rendering it improper.151
In the second half of his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas rebutted the majority’s three
arguments as to why the commerce power regulated medical marijuana use: first, medical
marijuana substantially affected interstate commerce, second, regulating medical marijuana was
“essential” to regulate interstate drug market, third, that regulating the medical marijuana was
“incidental” to regulating the interstate drug market.152 Justice Thomas argued that Congress
could not regulate non-economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce; rather it
could regulate activities whose regulation is a necessary and proper means to regulate the
interstate market. The justice said the majority expanded the scope of medical marijuana by
defining it as the “intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana”, and did not focus on
actual evidence linking medical marijuana with interstate commerce.153 Then, he argued that the
majority expanded the definition of economics to the “broadest possible”, and that this was a
mockery to Madison’s idea of limited federalism. Furthermore, Justice Thomas said the
Supreme Court should focus on the words present in the Constitution; “economics” was not one
of those words. The majority’s use of the word “economics”, instead of “commerce”, further
expanded the scope of the commerce power.154 Justice Thomas argued that by doing this the
majority was “rewriting” the commerce power based on the idea that if Congress cannot regulate
“the entire web of human activity, Congress will be left powerless to regulate the national
economy effectively.”155 Justice Thomas believed that the majority expanded the commerce
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clause by using the substantial effects test and definition of “economics” among other tactics to
prove that medical marijuana affected interstate commerce.
According to Justice Thomas, regulating intrastate medical marijuana was “essential and
incidental” to the CSA’s comprehensive regulatory system was unconstitutional. As previously
reasoned, regulating medical marijuana use was not “essential” in regulating the CSA’s
comprehensive scheme according to the necessary and proper clause. Furthermore, Justice
Thomas contended that regulating an activity cannot be “purely incidental”. Justice Thomas
previously explained why California’s allowance of medical marijuana did not undermine the
comprehensive system. In light of Justice Thomas’s argument pertaining to the commerce power
thus far, he contended that medical marijuana was noncommercial and purely intrastate;
therefore, Congress could not regulate it under the interstate commerce clause.156

Conclusion

Justice Stevens’s opinion did not rely on any constitutional grounds or firm Supreme
Court precedent. The majority merely decided that if Congress could rationally conclude that
intrastate, noncommercial medical marijuana use could affect interstate commerce then Congress
could regulate it. However, the majority delivered two convincing arguments. First, Congress
had to regulate intrastate medical marijuana use to effectively regulate the CSA’s comprehensive
regulatory system. Second, that Wickard allowed Congress to regulate intrastate, noncommercial
commodities for personal use. However, the majority opinion ignored Justice O’Connor’s point
that the wheat production in Wickard was on a much larger scale than the marijuana use and
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cultivation in Raich. The Secretary of Agriculture under the AAA regulated several acres of
wheat, whereas in contrast, the DEA only destroyed Monson’s six marijuana plants. Justice
O’Connor made another stronger argument against Wickard; the Wickard court had empirical
evidence of its effects on interstate commerce. Whereas, in Raich, the majority opinion
dismissed the need for actual evidence, and said that only a rational basis is needed. Justice
O’Connor said the majority’s opinion expanded the Congress’s power to regulate nearly all
“productive human activity”.157 The only clear limit to the commerce power is if the statute in
question falls entirely outside the scope of interstate commerce and is not part of a
comprehensive regulatory system.
Justice Thomas rooted his argument in powers enumerated by the Constitution, mainly,
the interstate commerce clause and necessary and proper clause. In this vein, he made a good
point by saying the Constitution does not authorize Congress to regulate “economics”, but
“commerce”. This argument intended to disparage the majority’s broad definition of
“economics.” Like Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia rooted his argument in the Constitution’s
interstate commerce clause and necessary proper clause. He made a solid, logical argument in
saying that Congress can only regulate activities necessary and proper in regulating interstate
commerce. However, Justice Scalia failed to explain how intrastate medical marijuana use is
necessary and proper in regulating interstate commerce. He merely said Congress could regulate
it under the CSA’s comprehensive regulatory system. He also stated that the federal government
should not have to rely on state law to regulate marijuana in the name of federalism. Justice
O’Connor—who rooted her argument in a traditional understanding of federalism and Supreme
Court precedent— disagreed with Justice Scalia’s statement about federalism. She argued that
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an “all-encompassing” comprehensive regulatory system removed “meaningful limits on the
commerce clause.”158
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V.

Chapter V. What Remains: the Commerce Clause and Medical Marijuana

Gonzales v. Raich was the furthest-reaching interpretation of the commerce clause to
date. However, it had little effect on later Supreme Court cases and California’s medical
marijuana policy. Through April 2011, Raich has been cited in thirteen Supreme Court cases
since being decided and has not had any significant bearing on those cases.159 So far it has not
been used in other challenges to the commerce power. The Supreme Court has applied different
standards of review in commerce clause cases since Raich, particularly United States v.
Comstock. After Raich, the Supreme Court reviewed a few cases that challenged the application
the CSA to certain drug related activities. Gonzales v. Oregon and Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal (UDV) challenged the CSA and won. These cases
strongly resembled Raich, but escaped the CSA’s comprehensive regulatory system. The
Supreme Court applied different standards of review in Oregon and UDV, thus the CSA did not
regulate the drug-related activity in question. The Supreme Court applied the rational basis test
in Raich, which may explain why it has had little effect on later commerce clause cases. There
appears to be no clear reason why the Supreme Court applies the standard of review that they do.
However, in the years after Raich, the Supreme Court has maintained the expansive nature of the
commerce clause.
After Gonzales v. Raich, Angel Raich challenged the federal government on her right to
use medical marijuana again. In 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that federal
government has the right to arrest and prosecute those using medical marijuana in compliance
with state law. Raich challenged the federal government on the basis that marijuana was a
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“medical necessity”.160 Judge Harry Pregerson denied her protection from federal prosecution.
However, he stated that if the government criminally prosecuted Raich for marijuana use and
possession; she would most likely meet the requirements for medical marijuana necessity.161
Even though Raich upheld the CSA’s application to medical marijuana users, it did not
invalidate the state law. Proposition 215 remained intact, although medical marijuana users were
subject to federal prosecution.162 In terms of congressional power, Raich opened the commerce
clause to virtually limitless power. It did this in three ways. First, it defined “economics” in
such a way that it was almost all encompassing. Second, Congress could now regulate noneconomic activities as long as regulating said activity was “essential” in regulating a
comprehensive regulatory system. Third, Congress did not need actual evidence to support an
activity’s substantial effect on interstate commerce, but merely a rational basis for assuming the
connection.163 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not use precedent established in Raich to
uphold the expansion of the commerce clause. However, the Supreme Court did uphold the
expansion of the commerce clause in other ways.
United States v. Comstock challenged the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
of 2006. This act established uniform laws regarding sex offender registration. Comstock
decided the constitutionality of its Title III, which granted the Attorney General the power to
commit those deemed “sexually dangerous” to federal custody. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme
Court said Congress had the power to regulate “sexually dangerous” people because of five
factors including the necessary and proper clause.164 These five factors were: the broad nature of
the necessary and proper clause, the federal government’s historical role regulating policy
regarding the mentally ill, the federal government’s interest in protecting the public’s safety, the
act’s recognition of states’ interests and powers, and act’s narrow regulatory scope.165 The
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Supreme Court ruled that in light of these four factors and the necessary and proper clause that
the act was constitutional. The court did not mention the commerce clause or a link between the
factors and another constitutional enumerated power.166 Even though the case did not rely on the
commerce power, Comstock serves as an example of the ever-expanding nature of the federal
government. It may even prove more expansive than Raich. If the Supreme Court had applied
the precedent in Raich to the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, the act would have
proved unconstitutional because it did not fall under “economics” defined as the “production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities”.167 While the Supreme Court did not use Raich
in deciding similar commerce clause and necessary and proper clause cases, it did promote the
expansion of federal power.
Even though the Supreme Court found the intrastate, noncommercial use of marijuana
fell under the CSA’s comprehensive regulatory system, the court ruled in Gonzales v. Oregon
and Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal (UDV), that certain drug
related activities were not a part of the comprehensive system. Oregon passed the Death with
Dignity Act allowing doctors to prescribe lethal doses of drugs in-order to “facilitate” suicide.168
Eight justices decided that the CSA did not apply to this activity. Although Justice Kennedy
asserted in the Opinion of the Court that the federal government had the right to set national
standards regulating the public’s health and safety even if those standards pertain to intrastate
acts. Furthermore, he said Oregon did not determine if the federal government could regulate
physician assisted suicides, but that the CSA did not.169 UDV dealt with another challenge to the
CSA’s comprehensive scheme. As a part of a religious ceremony, members of the UDV church
drank a South American herbal tea, which contained the drug, DMT. DMT was a schedule I,
hallucinogenic drug. The government challenged the church’s right to drink the tea under the
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The government contended that by illegalizing the
tea it would protect the health and safety of church members, prevent diversion into illicit
channels of drug commerce, and comply with the 1971 United Nations Convention of
Psychotropic Substances.170 The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny, required by the RFRA,
in deciding that the government did not demonstrate a compelling argument in applying the CSA
to the ceremonial tea.171 The court rejected the government’s comprehensive system argument
and diversion argument that it accepted in Raich.172 Both cases dealt with a small class of
individuals using a schedule I substance for personal, medical or religious, reasons. While the
cases were similar, the Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny to UDV and the rational basis test
to Raich. The RFRA required courts to apply a strict scrutiny analysis, meaning the government
had to provide compelling evidence as to why the activity should be illegal. No law pertaining to
Raich required a certain standard of review, thus the Supreme Court could apply the standard of
review that they saw fit. These were two examples of cases that avoided federal regulation under
the CSA’s comprehensive regulatory system on an as-applied basis.
The reason the Supreme Court did not use precedents established in Raich in later cases
may pertain to its standard of review. An article that evaluated the use of the rational basis test
in equal protection clause cases from 1971 to 1996 stated that no case using the rational basis test
had a “significant precedential impact on subsequent cases” and that the Supreme Court usually
ignores the case after its decision. The article searched for a “predictable pattern” in rational
basis Supreme Court cases that dealt with the equal protection clause. 173 The author tried to
determine why the Supreme Court used the standard of review that they did. However, the only
pattern he noticed was most of the cases dealt with a minority group of people, ranging from the
mentally ill to “hippies.”174 The same article said the Supreme Court never explains why it uses
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the rational basis test.175 This analysis may explain, in part, why Raich in spite of its powerful
commerce clause expansion has not had an impact on later Supreme Court cases. While Raich’s
use in future commerce clause, necessary and proper clause, and CSA cases remained low, it was
the first case after Lopez and Morrison to establish the trend of an expanding federal legislative
power.
While Gonzales v. Raich allowed for the continued federal prosecution of medical
marijuana patients in California, the state’s compassionate use programs remained intact. This
led to an escalation in tension between the federal and state governments over the medical
marijuana issue. In 2009, the federal government prosecuted a man for opening a stateauthorized medical marijuana dispensary in the Central Coast. The charges were for distributing
over one hundred kilos of marijuana. Jurors found him guilty and he faced a mandatory
minimum sentence of five years in a federal penitentiary.176 However, in October of 2009, the
Obama Administration asked federal authorities and the DEA to cease the arrest and prosecution
of medical marijuana patients in states that authorized such programs.177
After the federal versus state battle of medical marijuana programs cooled, California, in
2010, voted on a ballot initiative that would make the recreational use of marijuana legal.
Proposition 19 would allow for twenty-one year and older Californians to possess up to an ounce
of marijuana and a small number of plants.178 The ballot initiative, which received over 600,000
signatures, lost 54% to 46%. Proponents of Prop 19 plan on introducing another ballot initiative
to legalize marijuana use.179 In 2010, the U.S Attorney announced that Prop 19 would not
legalize marijuana in California and that federal marijuana laws would be strictly enforced.180
Medical marijuana is not a resolved issue. Tensions between federal and state governments
largely depend on the administration’s stance. In recent years, President H.W Bush closed the
62

federal compassionate use programs; President Clinton re-opened them, but continued the
prosecutions of those using medical marijuana under state-authorized programs. President
Obama became the first president to cease federal prosecutions on state-authorized users. This
suggests that the federal government may take a new stance after the election of a new president.
Furthermore, marijuana still carries a social stigma even though the Institute of Medicine’s report
and similar research show marijuana has therapeutic value for those with severe illness. Despite
this, only a minority of states have instituted medical marijuana programs. President Nixon
announced the evil of marijuana even after his own commission determined marijuana was a
benign substance. Barry McCaffrey ignored the Institute of Medicine’s research and reported the
opposite of the Institute’s findings. In regard to recreational use, the federal government has
made it clear that it opposes such state policies. Despite this, California citizens plan to launch
another campaign to pass a ballot initiative permitting recreational use. As for the commerce
power, the Supreme Court has made no indication it plans to limit its scope. Constitutional law
is ever evolving, the fate of the interstate commerce power lies in how far Congress pushes its
boundaries and how far the Supreme Court will allow it.
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